VALUE CHANGES AND THE DIMENSIONS OF FAMILISM IN THE EEC

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"De gustibus non est disputandum", title of article by J. Stigler and G. Becker in the American Economic Review, March 1977, pp.76-90.

"Il paraît que je suis un phénomène socio-culturel", caption of 1986 French advertissement showing a baby and advocating pro-natalism (sub-title: "la France a besoin de ses enfants")

1. The setting

If homo economicus fully determines actual behaviour and if the other dimensions of homo sapiens can, accordingly, be squeezed into an endogenous category, there is hardly any room for this paper: autonomous preference drifts and systematic patterning of tastes are assumed to be either non-existant or irrelevant. By contrast, if one accepts that choices with respect to family formation and reproduction also belong to the institutionally regulated and therefore to the political and moral spheres, this impoverished model must be refuted: we need to go beyond cost-benefit evaluations applied to changing material conditions. The latter point of departure fully recognizes the importance of material changes and of micro-economic theories, but it questions their sufficiency for the interpretation and extrapolation of demographic trends. While recognizing that morality is often adapted to suit needs and interests, our point of departure adds the possibility of reverse causation. In particular the transmission of meaning-giving or ideational goals (cf. Rokeach's "terminal values" or "preferable end-states of existence" (Rokeach, 1973), such as power, comfort, excitement, recognition and success, happiness or inner harmony, equity and justice, salvation) through agents of socialization and the individuals' own search for meaning-giving beacons in life are mechanisms that contribute to the specification of the object of economic optimization. In other words, economic rationality, bounded or not, is an

instrument of goal attainment that can be applied to a variety of ideational "end-states". In this sense, the ideational configuration may lead an economic cost-benefit calculus rather than being led by it. In addition, moral and normative prescriptions both limit and pattern strategies of action and the cost of deviance may change over time.

Not only do societal rankings of these preferable end-states of existence emerge and change over time, but organizational contexts may channel them in different directions, thereby producing patterned heterogeneity. In continental western Europe, for example, Versäulung, or the pillarization of society into competing political and religious factions, constitutes such a patterning of diversity that has left a marked historical imprint on demographic change since the second half of the 19th Century (e.g. Wolf, 1912; Van Heek, 1956; Bolton and Leasure, 1979; Lesthaeghe and Wilson, 1982; Lesthaeghe, 1983; van de Kaa, 1983)(1).

The objective of this paper is to explore how religious, moral and political dimensions have continued to shape the components of familism among the generations that currently constitute the adult EEC-population, and to produce elements that are complementary to those produced by economic theory and which may alter predictions of future trends.

2. The Issues

Two issues are of central interest. The first concerns the Easterlin hypothesis which has been credited with the incorporation of sociological features (socialization and aspirations), but which still sticks to a mechanism driven by material circumstance (relative income of generations) and economic competition within and, to a lesser degree, between cohorts (e.g. employment opportunities and relative cohort size). We shall argue that an additional mechanism is needed, one which not merely recognizes the central importance of socialization in periods of rapid economic growth, but also traces its effects within the domain of non-material responses.

The Maslowian theory of a "needs hierarchy" (1954) postulates that increasing income leads to a diminishing preoccupation with material needs or economic and political security and to a rising preoccupation with self-fulfillment and emancipation. Allardt and Uusitalo (1972) defined

this as a shift from orientations centered around "having" to orientations connected with "being" and "loving". Maslow projects an evolutionary scheme onto his drift to non-material needs, but this is not necessary for our purposes. Other schools of thought recognize that the better-off in many cultures have always had a predelection for the "higher order needs". Central to our argument, however, is that the period of post-war economic growth has indeed promoted a greater preoccupation with personal self-fulfillment and social emancipation. Translated into the terminology of Inglehart (1977) (who explicitly chose Maslowian drift as a starting point), a shift has occurred from "materialism" to "post-materialism". In Inglehart's battery of measures, materialist items are those that concern a preoccupation with inflation, economic growth, security, national defense, and law and order. The post-materialist items concern a move toward a less impersonal society, where ideas should count more than money, with increased room for political decision making for individuals and protection of freedom of speech. The original battery (Inglehart, 1977) contained 6 items in each set and the pure types are taken as those who pick two materialist (or post-materialist) items as their first choice. His index is then simply the proportion of pure post-materialists minus that of pure materialists. The proportion of mixed types, which commonly account for 40 to 55% of the population is omitted from the index. Inglehart's empirical research has highlighted the following features:

i) The shift since 1970 toward more post-materialism in the EEC follows essentially a <u>cohort model with short term period fluctuations</u> that are reversely related to the rate of inflation (see Figure 1). The life-cycle or age-effect, proposing that persons would become more materialists as they age, is found to be absent. The data from the 11 Eurobarometer-surveys held in the 6 original EEC-countries between 1970 and 1984 show that each younger cohort maintains higher scores on post-materialism than its predecessor throughout the segment of its lifetime covered by these 14 years of observation (Inglehart, 1985).

ii) Elites, identified by education and higher socio-economic status, form the leading edge of post-materialism in <u>all</u> cohorts.

iii) The political correlates of post-materialism are an



FIGURE 1 : INGLEHART INDEX OF VALUE PRIORITIES BY BIRTH COHORT (TOP) AND INFLATION RATE IN THE SIX ORIGINAL EEC-COUNTRIES (BOTTOM), 1970-84.

SOURCE : R. INGLEHART, 1985, p.107 AND EURO-BAROMETERS.

anti-establishment orientation (as measured by higher participation in protest activities such as demonstrations, petitions, strikes) and less nationalism (Burklin, 1981). Post-materialism is particularly prevalent in the peace movement (Inglehart, 1981, 1983), in the ecology parties or the "Greens" (Müller-Rommel and Wilke, 1981; Müller-Rommel, 1982), or in other "third force" movements in countries with a dominance of the two-party systems such as Britain or the US (Miller and Taylor, 1985).

These results are significant for several reasons. The overwhelming cohort effect noticed in a period of slowing economic growth indicates that a secular trend has been started that manages to perpetuate itself in economic circumstances which are clearly totally different from the golden sixties and which inflict a considerable share of economic hardship on the youngest generations (Preston, 1984; O'Higgins, 1984; Cantillon and Lesthaeghe, 1987).

The correlates of post-materialism belonging to the anti-establishment package also point in a direction that differs from the Maslowian starting point originally taken by Inglehart. A second source of drift toward post-materialism seems to stem from increased disenchantment with or alienation from the new technico-economic order as for instance described by D. Bell (1976). In essence, Bell points to the new order based on the centrality of theoretical knowledge, the creation of a new intellectual technology, the spread of a knowledge class, a domestication of science by other agents, all culminating in the emergence of new, often multinational, power complexes specializing in information gathering and control. In this instance, post-materialism is no longer carried by a preference drift fuelled by economic prosperity, but by a frustration with or Angst for the features of a new Orwellian era.

The object of disenchantment is however not limited to new power complexes such as the state, the military, the information controllers, the medical sector etc. Desinstitutionalisation has been equally prevalent in education and in the family (Berger and Berger, 1983). Ironically, the expectation of the 1960s went in the direction of fine-tuning both institutions: higher education needed to be democratized and the concept of a life-long bond of marriage was perceived as a hypocritical

straight-jacket for those for whom it did not work. Improvements in contraception allowed for births to be planned with greater accuracy as regards timing and number. All new legislation of the late 1960s and early 1970s liberalizing divorce and distribution of contraception was inspired by the argument that marriage and parenthood were going to be strengthened by the elimination of old constraints. Ten years later, the situation looks different: all institutions are in the dock, being accused of failing to live up to the "Great Expectations".

At first, our analysis parallels Easterlin's: there has been an explosion of expectations among the baby-boom cohorts of the 1950s and 60s. But it deviates from Easterlin's line in that these expectations were by no means confined to material ones. Also non-material aspirations rose and form a complex package which can be approximated by Inglehart's post-materialist value orientation. We shall show that it plays a role in deregulating the institutional context of union formation and procreation. This deregulation is not cyclical by nature: female labour force participation has not declined despite the crisis, liberalizations of family law have followed the social and economic evolution and are not reversed, contraceptive technology continues its progress, non-marital cohabitation spreads to all age groups, and post-materialism advances from cohort to cohort. These process characteristics seem to be cumulative rather than cyclical and point in the direction of continued sub-replacement fertility. This contrasts with the rise in fertility predicted by Easterlin for the 1980s.

The second issue deals with the secularization hypothesis. A portion of the literature dealing with the demographic transition in Europe over the last two centuries has pointed to the importance of secularism or the growth of ideologies which are no longer based on religious teaching. Well-known examples for continental Europe include the link between the drop in parity progression to third and fourth children in France coinciding with the French Revolution, especially in those areas where the ban on marriages during Lent and Advent was no longer followed (Weir, 1983) or where the preoccupations with salvation had declined, the geographical patterning of substantial leads and lags in the marital fertility transition corresponding to voting for secularized parties since 1870 in Switzerland, Belgium (Lesthaeghe and Wilson, 1982), Spain (Leasure, 1962),

Portugal and Italy (Livi Bacci, 1971 and 1977), Germany (Wolf, 1912), and the maintenance of high marital fertility in areas with strong religious patronage in Sweden (Lockridge, 1983) and the Netherlands (van Heek, 1956 and 1963; van de Kaa, 1983; van Poppel, 1983; Heeren, 1985). After the second World War, when surveys became a major source of individual-level data, persistant relationships were found between the degree of religious involvement (often measured through regularity of service attendance) and the modernization of contraception, the incidence of divorce and unmarried cohabitation. As the trend towards more secularism has continued, we expressed the expectation that the desinstitutionalisation of the family would progress further and that fertility levels would not rise in the 1980s (Lesthaeghe, 1985).

John Simons, while fully recognizing the historical role of secularism (1980)(2), advanced the proposition that the classic notion of "institutional religion" and its indicators would become inadequate (1986). Instead, he suggests a Durkheimian correction using the concept of a "civil religion" (originally defined by Bellah, 1967). Central to his argument is that individuals who are secularized in the traditional institutional sense may still subscribe strongly to a morality that upholds the functional prerequisites of societal integration and continuity. Applied to family formation and procreation, Simons considered divorce and unmarried cohabitation to be mere pattern transformations which do not endanger the functional prerequisite of demographic reproduction. The key issue for Simons is not the desinstitutionalization of the family by divorce or cohabitation, but the refusal of parenthood. Simons remains optimistic: deliberate childlessness - as distinct from childlessness resulting from "accidents de parcours" - is not widespread and cohort fertility, at least in the UK, would remain in the neighbourhood of two children (Simons, 1986). Furthermore, national pride would constitute an appropriate indicator of "civil religion". He documents his point with a statistical analysis using rank correlation coefficients between total fertility rates and country average scores on national pride taken from the European Value Study (cf. infra).

Our objections to Simons' analysis is that his statistical work based on series with 10 national averages each, single items from the EVS and rank correlations is largely inadequate, and that his view with respect to the

future demographic trends are too optimistic if extended to the whole of the EEC.

To sum up, we do not wish to deny the importance of trend components associated with changing economic opportunity structures, nor of "civil religion", but we feel that both Easterlin's and Simons' optimism, based on very different theories, is exaggerated. We shall highlighten several developments in the non-material domain that point in the direction of continued below replacement fertility in Western Europe, and then sketch a theoretical outline in which both economic and ideational change have their place.

3. The Data and the Variables

The data used come from the European Values Study (EVS) held in 9 EEC-countries in 1981.(3) The sample contains 12,464 adults (18+) of both sexes. There are roughly 1,000 individuals per country, except for Spain with twice that number, and Ulster with 312 persons being kept separately from the rest of the UK. The EVS-questionnaire was devoted essentially to the measurement of attitudes and opinions and contains few other variables. As such, it was certainly not devised for highly detailed demographic or socio-economic inquiry. It can, however, be used profitably to check Simons' propositions and to highlighten the developments with respect to value shifts and corresponding preference drift.

The core of the present paper consists of the measurement of some 20 value orientations, mostly by means of Guttman-scales or principle component analysis. These scales have been constructed on the basis of the entire sample and not on a country specific basis. In the process we lose some country specificity but gain on comparability.(4)

For the dependent variables we have constructed 5 scales that measure value orientations with respect to the family and procreation:

i) A general Guttman-scale for familism incorporating items that pertain to a variety of subjects such as marriage, divorce, abortion, sacrifice by parents for children, unmarried motherhood and stress on familism. The other scales are more specific:

ii) A Guttman-scale for the acceptability of the various grounds for abortion;

iii) A similar scale for the acceptability of divorce;

iv) A principle component scale for tolerance towards non-conformist behaviour with respect to marriage and procreation;

v) A Guttman-scale for the meaning of parenthood and concern with the familial context of socialization.

For independent variables we have included four sets of scales:

i) Three scales measuring religiosity. The first two are derived from substantially overlapping items, but one is based on the cumulative pattern typical for the Guttman-scale and the other on the extraction of common information typical for principle components. The third is a Guttman-scale for agreement with traditional morality as reflected in the Ten Commandments. As seven of the ten concern moral rather than strictly religious obligations, this scale reflects "civil" as well as "institutional" religion.

ii) Several scales pertaining to the Inglehart dimension of materialism versus post-materialism and its political correlates. The scales are a principle component of items showing a preoccupation with material advantages and security to serve along the Inglehart-scale itself, and additional principle component scales for nationalism, supra-nationalism, leftism, political involvement, aversion from political extremisms (both left and right), and intolerance towards ethnic/religious minorities and persons with different opinions.

iii) The third set of scales pertains to the degree of social involvement, i.e. involvement in philantropic or social activities, and altruism.

iv) The last set, finally, contains two principle component scales for dissatisfaction with life and anomy.

Table 1 : Definition and Measurement of Composite Variables

A. Guttman scales

All the Guttman scales were reduced to 4 categories by collapsing adjacent categories in such a way as to approximate as closely as possible a 20:30:30:20% frequency distribution.

1. General familism : original scale had 5 dichotomous items, R=.87, S=.47.
   - 1 = abortion and unmarried motherhood acceptable; no necessity for parents to sacrifice for children, marriage an outdated institution;
   - 2 = idem except marriage not outdated and wants more stress on the family;
   - 3 = same as 2 except believes in necessity for parents to sacrifice etc. (cf.2);
   - 4 = unmarried motherhood inacceptable, abortion acceptable only in restricted circumstances

2. Acceptability of abortion: original scale had 5 dichotomous items, R=.95, S=.78
   - 1 = abortion never justifiable or only when mother's life in danger;
   - 2 = acceptable also if child may be handicapped;
   - 3 = acceptable also to prevent unwanted birth;
   - 4 = acceptable on all grounds.

3. Acceptability of divorce : original scale had 5 dichotomous items, R=.91, S=.60.
   - 1 = divorce unacceptable or acceptable only on ground of physical violence;
   - 2 = acceptable also on grounds of adultery;
   - 3 = acceptable also on grounds of drinking;
   - 4 = acceptable also on other grounds (such as dissatisfaction with sexual relationship, sterility or long illness of partner).

4. Meaning of parenthood and concern context of socialization : original scale had 4 dichotomous items, R=.88, S=.57.
   - 1 = sterility not a reason for divorce, women do not need child(ren) for life fulfillment, child(ren) not necessary for success of marriage, child(ren) do not need both parents;
   - 2 = idem, except children need both parents;
   - 3 = same as 2, except child(ren) necessary for success of marriage;
   - 4 = same as 3, except child(ren) necessary for life fulfillment (may also consider sterility a valid ground for divorce).

5. Religiosity : original scale had 7 dichotomous items, R=.94, S=.74
   - 1 = agnostic, or only believes in existence of God;
   - 2 = describes self as a "religious person";
   - 3 = also draws strength and comfort from faith;
   - 4 = also attends church weekly (may also be a member of a religious organization and believe in self-sacrifice for God).

6. 10 Commandments: original scale had 10 dichotomous items, R=.88, S=.60
   - 1 = accepts at most the following 4 commandments : Thou shallt - not kill, not steal, honour parents, not bear false witness;
   - 2 = accepts in addition some/all of : Thou shalt - not covet neighbour's wife, not covet by neighbour's goods, not commit adultery;
   - 3 = accepts in addition one or both of : Thou shall - have no other Gods, not take name of the Lord in vain;
   - 4 = accepts all 10 commandments (10th : keep the Sabbath holy).

B. Principle Components (PC) : The four codes reflect the individual's position relative to the european average : 1 =) 1 st. dev. below ave.; 2 = (1 st. dev. below ave.; 3 = (1 st. dev. above ave.; 4 =) 1 st. dev. above ave.

7. Religiosity : 7 items; variance explained by PC = 60%. Items (and factor loadings) : importance of God in life (.86), draws strength and comfort from faith (.84), describes self as a religious person (.78), attends church weekly (.76), believes in personal God (.75), moments of prayer (.73), believes only in one true faith (.67).

8. Materialism : 3 items; variance explained by PC = 33%. Items : job security, good salary, or promotion cited as most important aspect of job (.71), would opt for extra work if working week shortened (.60), chooses "law and order" or "control inflation" on Inglehart scale (both .67).

9. Nationalism : 2 items, variance explained by PC = 60%. Items : national pride (.77); identification with country as a whole as opposed to village, town, region, Europe etc. (.77).

10. Intolerance : 2 items, variance explained by PC = .57%. Items : does not like to associate with people with different values (.76), dislikes religious or ethnic minorities (.76).

11. Aversion political extremism : 2 items, variance explained by PC = 83%. Items : dislikes leftist (.91) and rightist extremisms (.91).

12. Leftism : 4 items, variance explained by PC = 42%. Items : left-right self-rating on a 10 point scale (-.70), does not want capitalist control of the means of production (.70), believes labour should control means of prod. (.62), wants radical social change (.55).

13. Supranationalism : 2 items, variance explained by PC = .83%. Items : identification with Europe or world (.91), identification with region or smaller unit (-.91).

14. Political involvement : 4 items, variance explained by PC = 49%. Items : active political interest (.80), frequent political discussions (.79), participation in protest actions (strikes, demonstrations) (.59), close to political party (.59).

15. Social involvement : 2 items, variance explained by PC = 80%. Items : number of memberships in social organizations (.90), number of voluntary activities (.90).

16. Altruism and trust : 4 items, variance explained by PC = 38%. Items : considers others trustworthy (.64), considers everyone basically good (.59), would opt for voluntary activity if working week shortened (.59), sees nothing to sacrifice life for (-.52).

17. Dissatisfaction : 3 items, variance explained by PC = 55%. Items : satisfaction with life now (-.87), considers past (5 years ago) better than now (.72), future worse (.62).

18. Anomy and isolation : 4 items, variance explained by PC = 49%. Items : has frequent feeling of solitude (.75), frequent feeling that life is senseless (.64), ever lonely (.76), ever depressed (.68).

19. Non-conformism marriage and procreation : 4 items, variance explained by PC = 43%. Items : sexual freedom (.69), unmarried mothers (.67), marriage an outdated institution (.65), acceptability abortion (.60).

C. Other scales or variables

20. Materialism versus post-materialism (Inglehart scale) : 0 = first and second choice for post-materialist items (protection of freedom of speech, give people more say in important government decisions), 1 = mixed, 2 = choice for materialist items (law and order, fighting rising prices).

21. Preference 3+ children : 0 = prefers 2 or fewer children, 1 = prefers 3 or more.

Note : R = coefficient of reproducibility, S = coefficient of scalability; values between parentheses are factor loadings, i.e. correlation coefficients between the principle component and each indicator.

Details of the scales are given in Table 1. Included there are a list of items used in each scale and statistics indicating to which extent the scales capture patterning in the responses (e.g. Guttman's coefficients of reproducibility and scalability). In addition, for the principal component scales, the correlation of each item with the principle component is indicated, while for the Guttman-scales the meaning of the codes is given. Note that the number of items included in the scales ranged from 2 to 10, and that we have collapsed all Guttman and principle component scales to 4 categories. For the Guttman-scales, adjacent categories were collapsed in such a way as to approximate as closely as possible a 20:30:30:20 distribution. For the principle components, the categories are:

1: more than 1 standard deviation below the average;
2: less than or exactly 1 standard deviation below the average;
3: less than or exactly 1 standard deviation above average;
4: more than 1 standard deviation above average.

Given that the scales were constructed on the basis of the entire sample, individual scores relate to the European average.

Aside from these scales we have information on age and sex, on household income, labour-force participation of women, education, number of children, marital status and household composition. The measure of fertility had to be restricted to children ever born, studied for married women 30-39. Controls for marriage duration or length of exposure could not be made (these questions are missing). The EVS-questions concerning living arrangements among young people do not permit to identify non-marital cohabitation with accuracy: the category "living as married" (as opposed to "married") is included among the classic marital status categories so that many respondents who are in a consensual union had the option of specifying "single", "divorced" or "separated". Some improvement is possible by isolating those who are not living with their parents and are found in a household with another adult (who cannot be a descendant for respondents 18-29). But, the EVS fails to insert a question concerning the sex of this other adult. Sharing and non-marital cohabitation are hence confounded. This is a serious problem especially for the UK, Ireland and the Netherlands for which K. Kiernan (1986) reports frequencies of sharing that are larger than those of non-marital cohabitation. A further individual analysis of cohabitation had therefore to be dropped. On the whole, a major opportunity has been missed by the EVS since a few modifications in

the questionnaire would have permitted a superior measurement of fertility and non-marital cohabitation.

A few further remarks are in order. First of all, the Guttman- and principle component scales treat missing values in a different way: the latter has a listwise deletion of individuals as soon as a missing value for one of the indicators is encountered, the former uses the cumulative ordering of the items in attributing the highest non-missing score to the individual. The Guttman-scales retain individuals with partial non-response but at the expense of less accuracy in placing them on the scale. Since missing cases account for 0.3 to 25.8% of the sample, extra caution is needed when engaging in multivariate analyses. Finally, since all composite variables were simplified to a 1 to 4 scale, correlation coefficients were calculated on uniform 4x4 tables with marginals that approach normal distributions. The only exception is the Inglehart-scale, for which the original trichotomy is maintained.

4. National positions and age-related shifts

A full description of the national positions for selected variables together with the contrast between the oldest (50+) and youngest (18-29) age groups is given in the Appendix, tables A1 through A6. Here we shall limit ourselves to a description of the most important features. Table 2 gives a summary and reports the overall weighted European means and standard deviations, the contrast between the two age groups expressed in the European sigma and the contrast between the extreme countries. The overall standard deviations are close to unity, which is to be expected for the principle component scales, but the same also holds for the Guttman scales. The Inglehart-scale with 3 rather than 4 categories has of course a smaller sigma. The following observations can be made:

i) The contrast between the extreme countries is considerable (of the order of 1σ), but particularly outstanding for the scales that measure tolerance toward non-conformism with respect to the family (abortion scale, familism and non-conformism scales). These country contrasts are always larger than the age-group contrasts.

ii) Age related differences follow the expected pattern, with

Table 2 : Selected descriptive statistics for major value-scales (weighted), European Value Study sample, 1981[a)]

Value-scale[b)]	Mean $\bar{X}$	St. Dev. σ	Age effects[c)] $\bar{X}$(50+)	$\bar{X}$(LT30)	Difference in σ	Country effects[c)] $\bar{X}$ (highest country)	$\bar{X}$ (lowest country)	Range in σ	% with missing values
Familism (G)	2.82	.97	3.16	2.45	-.73	3.45 (IRL)	2.41 (DK)	1.07	22.1
Non-conformism (PC)	2.42	1.01	2.09	2.81	+.71	2.81 (F)	1.70 (IRL)	1.10	21.5
Acceptability of divorce (G)	2.44	1.05	2.35	2.53	+.17	2.86 (F)	1.88 (IRL)	0.83	0.3
Acceptability of abortion (G)	2.41	1.04	2.25	2.56	+.30	3.32 (DK)	1.33 (IRL)	1.91	10.3
Meaning of parenthood (G)	2.91	0.93	3.10	2.69	-.44	3.32 (F)	2.44 (NL)	0.95	14.9
Religiosity (G)	2.54	1.21	2.93	2.02	-.75	3.42 (IRL)	2.06 (DK)	1.12	15.3
10 Commandments (G)	2.52	1.10	2.93	2.00	-.85	3.18 (IRL)	2.06 (F)	1.02	14.2
Materialism (I)	1.21	0.66	1.36	1.02	-.52	1.42 (ULS)	0.88 (DK)	0.82	5.7
Nationalism (PC)	2.68	1.02	2.85	2.46	-.38	3.09 (IRL)	2.34 (D)	0.73	13.3
Leftism (PC)	2.49	0.93	2.27	2.75	+.52	2.90 (E)	2.07 (ULS)	0.94	25.8

a) Individual data weighted by relative population size of the country of residence

b) G = Guttman scale, PC = principal component, I = Inglehart scale. All scales are recoded here to a 1-4 scale, except the Inglehart-scale (0 = post-materialist, 1 = mixed, 2 = materialist). For details of the scales see table 1.

c) $\bar{X}$(50) = average score for persons aged 50+; $\bar{X}$(LT30) = average score for respondents 18-29. The relative age difference is measured as $\bar{X}$(LT30)-$\bar{X}$(50+)/overall σ; the relative national range = ($\bar{X}$ highest country - $\bar{X}$ lowest country)/overall σ.

particularly large contrasts for the Guttman scale of familism, the principle component of tolerance of non-conformism and all the religiosity scales (of the order of 0.75σ). Differences toward more post-materialism, more leftism and a weakening of the meaning of parenthood among the younger age groups are more moderate (of the order of 0.5σ) but sociologically still highly relevant.

iii) An important distinction is revealed by the country positions between the scale that measures the meaning of parenthood (child necessary for marriage and life fulfillment) and the other familism scales which essentially capture the degree of tolerance for non-conformism and desinstitutionalisation. France for instance scores very high on both, tolerance for non-conformism and meaning of parenthood, which contrast with Ireland (low on both) and Denmark (high on tolerance, low on meaning of parenthood). This bidimensionality is also revealed by the correlation matrix as we shall indicate later. Clearly, countries and individuals can show a great deal of tolerance toward divorce, abortion, unmarried cohabitation and single mothers while they may continue to attach major importance to parenthood as an element of personal fulfillment. These two factors are admittedly not perfectly orthogonal, but the distinction between them should be maintained. Simons' diagnosis that parenthood is largely a distinct dimension is fully confirmed.

iv) The large differences between the extreme countries do not imply that the intermediate countries are nicely spaced over the interval. The Guttman-scale for familism and the principle-component scale for tolerance of non-conformism place Denmark and France at one extreme and Ulster and Ireland at the other, but the remaining countries are all clustered in the middle. Rank correlation coefficients involving these variables can be very misleading. The specific scales for divorce and abortion produce more differentiation: Spain joins Ulster and Ireland with respect to low tolerance of abortion, and West Germany and the UK join the liberal end with respect to tolerance of divorce. Belgium is consistently to be found in the middle: the major patterns are present in Belgium but in great moderation.

v) The age-related differentials found in a single survey do not warrant

an interpretation in terms of age, period or cohort-effect (except for the Inglehart-scale with proven cohort dominance), but they are nevertheless striking reflections of past trends. The largest age contrasts are typically found in Spain, corresponding to the major political change since the Franco-era, and in Ulster, where the youngest generation seems to show a high degree of disenchantment with the values of the past and the symbols of religious cleavage. The contrast with the Irish Republic, where the age-related differentials are small, is striking.

vi) The scale for the meaning of parenthood is of particular interest for the past and possible future evolution of fertility. The most remarkable features are the very large age-related differentials in Denmark and the Netherlands and the relatively small ones in Spain, Italy and Belgium. Danish and Dutch youths appear to be extending non-conformism with respect to abortion, divorce etc. to parenthood as well (children need only one parent, children are no longer needed for personal fullfilment). The generations born in the period 1950-65 in these two countries seem to come rather close to Simons' critical point of confrontation, i.e. the questioning of parenthood.

v) Finally, a first glimpse of the association with the other scales can be gleaned from the country positions reported in Table A6. This essentially parallels Simons' analysis with rank correlation coefficients based on national averages, and the picture remains therefore impressionistic. Ireland and Ulster's high scores on familism and low scores for tolerance of non-conformist patterns of family formation are of course in concordance with the highest scores on religiosity and the lowest on leftism. France and Denmark's position at the other end of the tolerance scale conform to the high degrees of secularism and post-materialism. Except for nationalism (low as expected), Belgians again hold the middle ground. But, such an analysis falls considerably short of what can be extracted from the EVS. An individual-level analysis is needed.

5. The Patterning of Associations

The statistical associations between the various scales are presented in table 3 in the form of correlation coefficients. The vertical division separates the 4 scales with items that pertain to non-conformism with respect to union formation and socialization from the scale for the meaning of parenthood and a dichotomous variable indicating a preference for 3 or more children. The horizontal division separates the better predictors from the weaker ones. The following points emerge:

i) The religiosity scales are systematically the best predictors, followed by the Inglehart scale and its close correlates, nationalism and leftism. The associations between tolerance for non-conformism and the religiosity scales are particularly striking, whereas the meaning of parenthood scale is only marginally more associated with religiosity than with Inglehart's materialism or nationalism. Leftism is less important when it comes to predicting the meaning of parenthood, however.

ii) Most of the associations with the other value orientations have the expected signs but they are much weaker.

iii) The associations with the altruism and anomy or dissatisfaction scales are all smaller than .10 and have the expected signs for the first four familism scales. The meaning of parenthood-scale is, however, negatively correlated with social involvement, altruism and trust. It should be borne in mind that the meaning of parenthood items are worded in egocentric terms: a child is viewed in function of one's own fulfillment and not in function of the need of a group or society.

The correlations of Table 3 pertain to all respondents and are affected by the underlying age patterns. Hence, they could be spurious to a significant extent. In addition, we can advance the hypothesis of a major interaction with age: one might even expect the signs to change in function of the age group considered. The same set of associations has therefore been produced in table 4 for the youngest age group (18-29) only. This is the age group of greatest interest for future demographic developments.

Table 3 : Correlation Coefficients between various familism-scales and other value orientations, weighted, European Values Study sample , 1981[a)]

Value-scale[b)]	Familism-scale[b)] Familism (G)	Non-Conformism (PC)	Acceptability of abortion (G)	Acceptability of divorce (G)	Meaning of parenthood (G)	Preference for 3+ children
A. Religiosity						
Religiosity (G)	+.42	-.47	-.41	-.19	+.20	+.19
Religiosity (PC)	+.42	-.46	-.42	-.21	+.21	+.18
10 Commandments (G)	+.42	-.44	-.33	-.17	+.19	+.11
B. Materialism/Post-Materialism & its correlates						
Inglehart materialism (I)	+.24	-.23	-.16	-.07	+.17	+.05
Nationalism (PC)	+.20	-.16	-.12	-.04	+.15	+.09
Leftism (PC)	-.24	+.28	+.17	+.07	-.06	-.01
Materialism (PC)	+.15	-.12	-.08	-.05	+.13	+.00
Aversion extremisms (PC)	+.05	-.10	-.03	+.04	+.02	-.02
Intolerance (PC)	+.04	-.10	-.04	-.03	+.04	-.01
Supranationalism (PC)	-.12	+.12	+.08	+.04	-.04	-.03
Political involvement (PC)	-.15	+.14	+.13	+.07	-.04	-.01
C. Social involvement & altruism						
Social involvement (PC)	+.03	-.08	-.06	-.04	-.04	+.06
Altruism & trust (PC)	+.02	-.08	-.07	-.06	-.08	+.03
D. Dissatisfaction/anomy						
Dissatisfaction (PC)	-.29	+.08	+.03	+.02	+.01	+.01
Anomy (PC)	-.06	+.04	-.00	+.01	+.01	+.02

a) Individual data weighted by relative population size of the country of residence.

b) G = Guttmanscale, PC = principal comonent, I = Inglehart scale. All scales are recoded here to a 1-4 scale, except the Inglehart scale (0 = post-materialist, 1 = mixed, 2 = materialist) and the preference for a large family (0 = prefers 2 or fewer children, 1 = prefers 3+ children). For details of scales see table 1.

Table 4 : Correlation coefficients between various familism-scales and other value orientations, among those aged 18-29, weighted European Values Study Sample 1981[a)]

Value scale[b)]	Familism-scale[b)] Familism (G)	Non-Conformism (PC)	Acceptability Abortion (G)	Acceptability Divorce (G)	Meaning Parenthood (G)	Preference 3+ children
A. Religiosity						
Religiosity (G)	+.37	-.42	-.38	-.17	+.19	+.19
Religiosity (PC)	+.39	-.42	-.38	-.16	+.21	+.17
10 Commandments (G)	+.38	-.39	-.30	-.15	+.14	+.06
B. Materialism/post-materialism & its correlates						
Inglehart materialism (I)	+.26*	-.24*	-.13	-.04	+.20*	+.00
Nationalism (PC)	+.21*	-.16	-.16*	-.05*	+.11	+.02
Leftism (PC)	-.22	+.25	+.19*	+.09*	-.02	+.01
Materialism (PC)	+.15	-.11	-.05	-.01	+.16*	-.04
Aversion extremisms (PC)	+.02	-.04	+.01	+.00	+.03*	-.00
Intolerance (PC)	-.02	-.03	+.01	+.00	+.01	-.02
Supranationalism (PC)	-.10	+.06	+.03	+.03	-.05*	+.01
Political involvement (PC)	-.17*	+.17*	+.17*	+.04	-.10*	+.01
C. Social involvement & altruism						
Social involvement (PC)	+.02	-.06	-.04	-.04	-.09*	+.05
Altruism & trust (PC)	+.01	-.02	-.02	-.08*	-.10*	+.05*
D. Dissatisfaction & anomy						
Dissatisfaction (PC)	-.11*	+.10*	+.06*	+.05*	-.02	+.03*
Anomy (PC)	-.10*	+.09*	+.05*	+.07*	-.01	+.05*

a) } see notes to table 3.
b) }

c) Correlation coefficients marked by an asterisk (*) are larger in absolute value than the corresponding coefficients for all age groups (table 3).

The weakening of the associations observed from the comparison of tables 3 and 4 is, however, not marked and changes in sign occur only for coefficients which were already very close to zero. In addition, the absolute values of several coefficients rise (see asterisks in table 4). Restricting the analysis to the latest generation is seen to generate only a modest shift in patterning, characterized by the following features:

i) The associations between the various familism scales and the three religiosity scales are slightly weakened, but they remain stronger than the others. The direction of this change is in accordance with Simons' contention that institutional religion becomes a predictor of less importance, but the process is not yet as far advanced as he indicated.

ii) In the wake of advancing secularization, several aspects of Inglehart's dimension (post-materialism, anti-nationalism, leftism and greater political involvement) move to greater prominence as far as predictive power is concerned. However, considering the direction of the signs is tandem with the fact that the youngest age group has the highest scores on post-materialism, anti-nationalism, leftism and political awareness and involvement, these findings suggest that civil religion may not provide such a secure anchorage for the familism dimensions after all. In other words, Simons is right in proposing that the institution of marriage and the meaning of parenthood are increasingly grounded in civil rather than in institutional religion, but he fails to recognize that overall morality and identification with society are lowest among the youngest cohorts. Again, the age patterns considered in the previous section, but omitted from Simons' analysis, prove to be crucial.

iii) Equally noteworthy is that, among the younger cohorts, the scales for anomy and for dissatisfaction with life and its prospects become more closely associated with non-conformism with respect to the institutional context of union formation and socialization of offspring. As this generation has been particularly affected by the economic depression, this strengthening of the associations does not support Simons' optimistic view either.

Table 5 : Canonical correlation analysis of value orientations for total sample and for age group 18-29, weighted European Values Study sample, 1981[a)]

1st canonical variate

all ages 18+ : eigenvalue = .37, canonical correlation = .61, Wilk's lambda = .56
ages 18-29 : " = .36, " " = .60, " " = .55

Y1 : correlation coefficients GE .20

Familism scale[b)]	All Ages	18-29
Familism (G)	+.83	+.81
Non-conformism (PC)	-.89	-.85
Acceptability of abortion (G)	-.72	-.70
Meaning of parenthood (G)	+.38	+.41
Acceptability of divorce (G)	-.36	-.31
Preference for 3+ children	+.28	+.20

X1 : correlation coefficients GE .20

Value scale	All Ages	18-29
Religiosity (PC)	+.88	+.84
Religiosity (G)	+.86	+.82
Guttman 10 Commandments (G)	+.79	+.75
Inglehart materialism (I)	+.40	+.47
Leftism (PC)	-.42	-.40
Nationalism (PC)	+.36	+.36
Political involv. (PC)	-.20	-.30
Supranationalism (PC)	-.20	-
Materialism (PC)	+.20	+.22

2nd canonical variate

all ages 18+ : eigenvalue = .04, canonical correlation = .20, Wilk's lambda = .92
ages 18-29 : " = .06, " " = .24, " " = .86

Y2 : correlation coefficients GE .20

Familism scale	All Ages	18-29
Meaning of parenthood (G)	+.67	+.82
Acceptability of abortion (G)	+.37	+.23
Acceptability of divorce (G)	+.36	+.38
Non-conformism (PC)	-	+.22

X2 : correlation coefficients GE .20

Value scale	All Ages	18-29
Altruism/trust (PC)	-.69	-.64
Social involvement (PC)	-.47	-.51
Materialism (PC)	+.47	+.53
Inglehart mat. (I)	+.47	+.43
Nationalism (PC)	+.26	-
Religiosity (G)	-.23	-
Religiosity (PC)	-.20	-

a) See notes to table 3
b) " " " " "

The patterning of the associations can be further highlighted by a canonical correlation analysis. This technique is analogous to factor analysis in the sense that it extracts and builds orthogonal dimensions from a set of indicators, but it has the advantage of maintaining a distinction between dependent and independent variables. Application to the correlations of tables 3 and 4, i.e. for all respondents and the youngest age group respectively, resulted in extraction of two orthogonal canonical variates (table 5). The best indicators of X1, i.e. those describing the independent side of the first canonical variate, are typically the religiosity scales followed by leftism and the Inglehart scale. The best indicators of the dependent side, Y1, are the scales measuring tolerance for unmarried mothers, sexual freedom, reduced parental responsibility, non-marital cohabitation, abortion and divorce, i.e. the scales based on the non-conformist items. The canonical correlation between X1 and Y1 amounts to .60 or .61, depending on the sample. This implies that there is a fairly stringent patterning connecting the non-conformist aspects of union formation and procreation to secularism followed by post-materialism, leftism and anti-nationalism.

The second canonical variate displays a much weaker association between the two sides: the canonical correlations are only .20 and .24. The dependent side, Y2, is best identified by the Guttman scale for the meaning of parenthood and connects it to <u>less</u> altruism, <u>less</u> social involvement and <u>more</u> materialism on the independent side, X2. The distinctiveness of the ideational aspects of parenthood is not only revealed once more, but the meaning of parenthood is cast more in egocentric terms than in terms of societal duty. Couples and individuals apparently become parents to satisfy their private needs and not because of some higher Durkheimian calling. This is bad news not only for the sponsors of the French highway posters (cf. "la France a besoin de ses enfants") but more generally for the anchorage of parenthood to institutional and civil religion alike.

6. <u>How Nations Differ</u>

The EVS-data enable us to check whether national difference in the familism scales and actual behaviour (average parity, non-marital cohabitation and sharing) can be accounted for by differences in religiosity, materialism,

leftism, female labour force participation, household income, and education. These checks have been performed through analyses of variance and multiple classification (MCA). Such multivariate analysis involving listwise deletion of missing cases leads however to a substantial reduction in sample sizes. Limiting the analysis to men and women below age 50, sample sizes decline from 3200-4000 to 1600-1800. The national averages produced by the MCA-tables needed therefore to be compared with the averages for the total population. This comparison (Lesthaeghe and Meekers, 1987) revealed that the country positions remained intact and that the reduction in sample size did not lead to a systematic selection bias.

The results for the Guttman-scale of familism, the Guttman-scale for tolerance of abortion and the principle component of non-conformism are largely analogous, as could be expected from the fact that items overlap and that intercorrelations are strong (.57 to .71). The full analysis is presented elsewhere (Lesthaeghe and Meekers, 1987) and we shall restrict this presentation to the non-conformism scale (sexual freedom, unmarried mothers, marriage an outdated institution, acceptability of abortion). The MCA-results are reported in Table 6 for men and women aged 18-49 separately. The current design introduces the factors (other scales) prior to the covariates (female labour-force participation, income, education, age). All predictors together account for slightly more than a third of the variance. The association with the religiosity scale is again preponderant (eta = .49 for men and .51 for women) and resistant to controls (beta = .39 and .40). Nationalism, materialism versus postmaterialism, and leftism produce less variation (etas of the order of .25 to .30, reduced after controls to betas of the order of .10 to .14). The original national patterning is considerably reduced by the controls: among men the 1.20 point difference between the extremes (France versus Ireland) is reduced to a 0.30 point difference (σ=1.0 point) and eta declines from a value of .28 to a beta-coefficient of only .12. Among women, the effect of the controls is weaker: the original range of 1.26 points declines to .71 points with a shift in eta from .33 to a beta of .20. Hence, national differences are considerably more resistant for women than men, despite the fact that female labour-force participation (the only significant covariate) is added as an extra independent variable for women.

The Guttman-scale for the meaning of parenthood (sterility a reason for

Table 6 : Multiple Classification Analysis for scores on the principle component of non-conformism with respect to marriage and procreation, age group 18-49, unweighted European Values Study data, 1981

	Men $\bar{X}$ = .24 (N = 1628)		Women $\bar{X}$ = .05 (N = 1671)	
	Unadjusted deviations	Adjusted deviations	Unadjusted deviations	Adjusted deviations
Factors				
Nationality				
- France	+.38	+.10	+.41	+.25
- Denmark	+.20	-.03	+.37	-.01
- Spain	+.13	+.13	-.02	+.10
- W-Germany	+.03	-.12	+.10	-.11
- Netherlands	+.01	-.05	-.18	-.14
- Belgium	-.06	+.07	-.11	-.13
- Great Britain	-.07	-.10	+.00	-.12
- Italy	-.12	+.08	+.12	+.29
- Ulster	-.25	+.13	-.13	+.04
- Ireland	-.81	-.27	-.85	-.42
(eta/beta)	(.28)	(.12)	(.33)	(.20)
Religiosity (G)[a)b)]				
1 agnostic, merely believes in God	+.49	+.38	+.66	+.50
2 describes self as religious	+.01	+.03	+.22	+.18
3 draws strength from faith	-.33	-.27	-.08	-.05
4 attends church weekly	-.84	-.67	-.64	-.51
(eta/beta)	(.49)	(.39)	(.51)	(.40)
Materialism (Inglehart scale)[a)b)]				
0 post-materialist	+.55	+.27	+.52	+.22
1 mixed	-.06	-.03	+.02	+.02
2 materialist	-.33	-.16	-.30	-.15
(eta/beta)	(.29)	(.14)	(.27)	(.12)
Nationalism (PC)[a)]				
1 more than 1σ below average	+.57	+.22	+.56	+.20
2 1σ or less than 1σ below average	+.00	+.01	-.04	-.05
3 up to 1σ above average	-.03	-.02	+.05	+.05
4 1σ or more above average (nationalist)	-.37	-.14	-.29	-.09
(eta/beta)	(.28)	(.11)	(.25)	(.10)
Leftism (PC)[a)]				
1 more than 1σ below average (right)	-.37	-.15	-.39	-.17
2 1σ or less than 1σ below average	-.24	-.05	-.18	-.05
3 up to 1σ above average	-.00	-.04	+.03	+.00
4 1σ or more above average (left)	+.58	+.22	+.54	+.22
(eta/beta)	(.30)	(.11)	(.28)	(.11)
Percentage of variance explained by factors		33.2		35.6
Covariates :		- age - income (n.s.) - education		- age (n.s.) - income (n.s.) - education (n.s.) - labour-force participation
Percentage of variance explained by factors + covariates		34.0		36.1

a) for details of this scale see table 1

b) for details of the categories used see table 1

c) n.s. = not significant at 5% level.

Table 7 : Multiple classification analysis for scores on the Guttman-scale for the meaning of parenthood, age group 18-49, unweighted European Values Study data, 1981

	Men $\bar{X}$ = 1.80(N = 1671)		Women $\bar{X}$ = 1.70(N = 1736)	
	Unadjusted deviations	Adjusted deviations	Unadjusted deviations	Adjusted deviations
Factors				
Nationality				
- France	+.41	+.55	+.67	+.75
- Italy	+.25	+.10	+.33	+.14
- Spain	+.19	+.16	+.34	+.22
- Ulster	+.13	-.05	-.04	-.11
- Belgium	+.09	+.08	+.11	+.15
- W-Germany	-.11	+.01	-.18	+.05
- Denmark	-.12	+.01	-.40	-.19
- Britain	-.24	-.26	-.61	-.55
- Ireland	-.34	-.57	-.28	-.48
- Netherlands	-.69	-.60	-.47	-.44
(eta/beta)	(.31)	(.33)	(.42)	(.40)
Religiosity (G)[a)b)]				
1 agnostic, merely believes in God	-.15	-.14	-.35	-.29
2 describes self as religious	-.00	+.00	-.04	-.01
3 draws strength from faith	+.25	+.18	+.26	+.14
4 attends church weekly	+.12	+.16	+.16	+.18
(eta/beta)	(.16)	(.14)	(.24)	(.19)
Materialism (Inglehart scale)[a)b)]				
0 post-materialist	-.31	-.19	-.47	-.21
1 mixed	+.02	+.03	-.03	+.01
2 materialist	+.22	+.09	+.28	+.09
(eta/beta)	(.18)	(.10)	(.24)	(.10)
Nationalism (PC)[a)]				
1 more than 1σ below average	-.31	-.21	-.43	-.29
2 1σ or less than 1σ below average	+.04	+.03	+.03	+.04
3 up to 1σ above average	-.02	-.04	+.02	+.01
4 1σ or more above average (nationalist)	+.20	+.15	+.17	+.09
(eta/beta)	(.12)	(.12)	(.17)	(.11)
Leftism (PC)[a)]				
1 more than 1σ below average (right)	+.05	+.05	+.01	-.01
2 1σ or less than 1σ below average	+.03	+.03	+.04	+.03
3 up to 1σ above average	-.02	-.03	-.01	-.04
4 1σ or more above average (left)	-.03	-.00	-.06	+.05
(eta/beta)	(.03)	(.03) (n.s.)	(.03)	(.03) (n.s.)
Percentage of variance explained by factors		16.7		26.1
Covariates :		- age (n.s.) - income (n.s.) - education		- age (n.s.) - income (n.s.) - education - labour-force participation (n.s.)
Percentage of variance explained by factors + covariates		18.0		27.1

a) for details of this scale see table 1

b) for details of the categories used see table 1

c) n.s. = not significant at 5% level

divorce, children need both parents, child necessary for succes of marriage, child necessary for women's life fulfillment) has been submitted to the same analysis. The results, presented in table 7, are strikingly different, as was to be expected from the canonical correlation analysis. Firstly, a smaller proportion of the variance is explained: 18% for men and 27% for women. Secondly, the original national positions are totally robust (eta-coefficient equal beta-coefficient). Thirdly, the effect of religiosity declines to the levels of those produced by the Inglehart-scale and nationalism. Fourthly, leftism drops out completely. Fifthly, of all covariates, only education shows an additional significant effect.

The conclusion to be drawn is that tolerance for non-conformism and the meaning of parenthood constitute not only distinct dimensions, but that the national positions with respect to the former can be reduced to a large extent to the other explanatory variables, whereas the positions with respect to the latter remain totally intact.

Is there a relationship between the dimensions of familism, as measured through the EVS, and actual behaviour? As indicated earlier, the EVS does not allow for the measurement of non-marital cohabitation and we shall rely on measurements from other sources. These are presented in Table 8 and are reported by INED (1983), Kiernan (1986) and several national sources. The EVS-estimates of cohabitation and sharing combined for women 18-29 are added for comparison. They also provide the upper limits of the percentages cohabiting in Ulster, Italy and Spain. On the whole, the various series agree rather well. The only major exception pertains to the Netherlands where we have prefered the figure from a detailed Dutch survey (15%) over Kiernan's (7%). For the rest, Kiernan's figures seem plausible and have the added advantage of separating sharing from cohabitation. The series of percentages cohabiting is plotted in Figure 2 against the principle component scale of tolerance towards non-conformism (EVS, both sexes combined, 18-29). The dates on the figure refer to the year during which the total first marriage rate fell below 80%. The correlation between the estimates of actual behaviour and the EVS non-conformism scale is only +.56 and several national residuals are substantial. The figure conveys the impression that there is ample room for an increase in the incidence of non-marital cohabitation, given the liberal attitudes of the youngest generation in France, Spain and Italy.

Table 8 : Percentages of young women in non-marital cohabitation or sharing in selected EEC-countries according to various sources

	Women 20-24			Women 18-29
	% Non-marital cohabit.		% sharing	% Non-marital cohabit. + sharing
	INED or other	Kiernan 1982	Kiernan 1982	EVS 1981
Denmark	30 (1975)	42	4	42
West-Germany	-	14	4	20
Netherlands	15 (1982)[a)]	7	9	15
France	8 (1981)	12	2	11
UK	5 (1979)	6	7	13
Ireland	-	1	10	10
Belgium	7 (1982)[b)]	-	-	5
Spain	-	-	-	7
Italy	-	-	-	4
Ulster	-	-	-	5

a) Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics, Onderzoek Gezinsvorming

b) Flanders only, Ministry of Flemish Community, NECO-4

Table 9 : Percentages of women aged 18-29 who have left the parental household and are currently sharing or cohabiting, according to scores on value scales, total weighted European Values Study data, 1981

Value orientation[a)]	% sharing or cohabiting
familism (G)	$\bar{X}$ = 10 (N = 1273)
1 marriage outdated institution etc.	19
2 marriage not outdated, wants more stress family	11
3 abortion & unmarr. motherhood tolerable	7
4 unmarr. moth. acceptable, abortion only on limited grounds	4
non-conformism in marriage & procreation (PC)	$\bar{X}$ = 11 (N = 1301)
1 more than 1σ below average (conformist)	4
2 1σ or less than 1σ below average	8
3 up to 1σ above average	10
4 1σ or more above average (non-conformist)	18
religiosity (G)	$\bar{X}$ = 11 (N = 1327)
1 agnostic, only believes in God	17
2 describes self as religious	9
3 draws strength from faith	10
4 attends church weekly	3
Inglehart materialism	$\bar{X}$ = 12 (N = 1480)
0 post-materialist	17
1 mixed	11
2 materialist	9
nationalism (PC)	$\bar{X}$ = 11 (N = 1307)
1 more than 1σ below average	17
2 1σ or less than 1σ below average	10
3 up to 1σ above average	9
4 1σ or more above average (nationalist)	8
leftist (PC)	$\bar{X}$ = 11 (N = 1130)
1 more than 1 below average (right)	5
2 1σ or less than 1 below average	13
3 up to 1σ above average	10
4 1σ or more above average (left)	14

a) For details of scales and categories used see table 1.



⊡ Percent women 18-29 cohabting or sharing (EVS 1981)
(77) Date of decline of total first marriage rate below 0.80

FIGURE 2 : RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN 20-24 IN NON-MARITAL COHABITATION AND NATIONAL SCORE ON THE SCALE FOR TOLERANCE OF NON-CONFORMISM WITH RESPECT TO MARRIAGE AND PROCREATION, EEC COUNTRIES 1981-82.

Table 9 presents the percentages of young women who have left the parental home but who are not yet married (cohabitation or sharing) according to selected value-scales. All data stem from the EVS. The expected differences clearly emerge for all scales and they are particularly strong for the two familism scales measuring tolerance towards non-conformism and the religiosity scale. Moreover, independent residence prior to marriage is clearly curtailed for young women with weekly religious service attendance and right wing sympathies. Presumably, these women come from strict families, mainly located in the Catholic countries of the EEC(5).

A further MCA (N=686) permits controls for age, education and labour-force participation. The main result is that, despite the significance of all other factors and covariates, the national deviations remain totally resistant. Moreover, they point in the direction of a clustering of countries into two groups: the latin countries with a Catholic historical tradition tend to have fairly large negative residuals and the germanic countries with a Protestant or mixed tradition exhibit zero or positive residuals.

The analysis of average parity for married women 30-39 follows similar steps. First, a check for the reliability of the EVS-estimates is made in table 10 by comparing EVS-national average parities to the mean of the 1975 and 1983 total fertility rates (TFR) (the generation aged 30-39 in 1981 had the bulk of its offspring in the 10 years prior to the survey). The two quantities are obviously not directly comparable as period TFR's are highly susceptible to tempo changes in procreation. Moreover, the EVS-fertility measure contains no control for duration of exposure, and the sample sizes are only of the order of 90 women per country. An analysis of such data is quite hazardous. Nevertheless, we decided to pursue it since the national series of TFR's and the series of EVS-average parity match much better than we had expected. The relationship between average parity and value orientations is presented in table 11. As expected, the value dimension capturing the meaning of parenthood produces the largest variation in average parity, namely 231-187=44 children per 100 married women 30-39. The Guttman-scale for familism is equally related to actual fertility with a difference of 31 children between its extreme categories. Religiosity comes next with 28 children, but the Inglehart-scale trails behind with 12

Table 10 : Comparison of average parity for European Values Study sample, 1981, and average observed total fertility rates 1975 and 1983, by country

	average of 1975 and 1983 TFR's	average parity married women 30-39, EVS
Ireland	3.07	2.99
Ulster	2.52	2.73
Spain	2.25	2.45
France	1.86	2.32
Italy	1.86	2.08
Great Britain	1.77	2.23
Denmark	1.65	2.05
Belgium	1.65	2.03
Netherlands	1.57	1.99
W-Germany	1.39	1.70

Table 11 : Average parity for married women aged 30-39 by position on selected value-scales, weighted European Values Study sample, 1981[a)]

Value orientation[b)]	Average parity
familism (G)	$\bar{X}$ = 2.13 (N = 701)
1 marriage outdated institution etc.	2.07
2 marr. not outdated, wants more stress on family	1.95
3 abortion & unmarr. motherhood tolerated	2.13
4 unmarr. motherh. acceptable, abortion only on limited grounds	2.38
non-conformism in marriage & procreation (PC)	$\bar{X}$ = 2.13 (N = 716)
1 more than 1σ below average (conformist)	2.30
2 1σ or less than 1σ below average	2.20
3 up to 1σ above average	1.95
4 1σ or more above average (non-conformist)	2.16
meaning of parenthood (G)	$\bar{X}$ = 2.15 (N = 806)
1 child(ren) not necessary, children don't need both parents	1.87
2 child(ren) not necessary, but need both parents	1.91
3 child(ren) necessary for success of marriage	2.34
4 child(ren) necessary for life fulfillment	2.31
religiosity (G)	$\bar{X}$ = 2.15 (N = 774)
1 agnostic, merely believes in God	2.00
2 describes self as religious	2.13
3 draws strength from faith	2.16
4 attends church weekly	2.28
Inglehart materialism	$\bar{X}$ = 2.15 (N = 854)
0 post-materialist	2.02
1 mixed	2.18
2 materialist	2.14
nationalism (PC)	$\bar{X}$ = 2.12 (N = 768)
1 more than 1σ below average	2.22
2 1σ or less than 1σ below average	2.14
3 up to 1σ above average	1.97
4 1σ or more above average (nationalist)	2.22

a) Individual data weighted by relative population size of country of residence

b) For details of scales and of categories used, see table 1

children, whereas nationalism shows no linear pattern or systematic deviation. As we said before, the EVS information on fertility is far from what demographers are used to, but the present results are again indicative of the fact that institutional religion provides a strong support for procreation for a fifth of the population. By contrast, Simons' link with nationalism vanishes completely when individual-level analyses are used.

The addition of age, labour-force participation and education to the value scales via an MCA doubles the amount of variance explained, but strong national patterning remains: eta = .29 for nationality versus beta = .21 after controls. The original range of 155 children for 100 married women 30-39 (Ireland versus West Germany) is only reduced to 97 children (still Ireland versus Germany).

Other relationships between fertility indicators and the value dimensions of non-conformism and the meaning of parenthood were tried. The clearest one is shown in Figure 3 where the percentage drop in TFR since 1965 is plotted against the sum of the national scores for the meaning of parenthood and general familism for the youngest generation. The countries that currently combine low scores on the meaning of parenthood and have a great tolerance for non-conformist behaviour (i.e. Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany) among the generation which is currently facing and making the crucial decisions, are also the ones that experienced the largest drop in TFR (more than 45%). Belgium and France have relative declines in TFR's that are expected on the basis of the two scales, but the French combination of high tolerance of non-conformism (equal to Denmark's) and a strong meaning-giving support for parenthood (typical for the latin countries) contrasts with Belgium's systematic central position on most dimensions. The UK has a negative residual: despite its lower score on the meaning of parenthood, Britain has experienced only a modest drop in TFR (only Ireland has a smaller relative decline since 1963). The reverse holds for Spain and Italy where the stronger meaning of parenthood has not prevented a larger relative decline in period fertility. Simons' explanation for the smaller drop in fertility in Britain through high scores of national pride does not hold either: Spain scores even higher on nationalism but has a substantial positive residual on figure 3.



Figure 3 : Relationship between the relative decline in period fertility, 1965-83, and the national scores on the two major dimensions of familism among the young Europeans, 1982.

7. Collecting the Fragments

Tolerance toward non-conformism with respect to union formation, dissolution, abortion etc. proves, as Simons suggested, to be a different dimension from the meaning of parenthood. However, the two dimensions are not completely orthogonal. Their respective associations with the other value orientations used in this paper have consistently opposite signs which means that they both respond, each in its own way, to a common set of predictors. Admittedly, non-marital cohabitation, divorce and non-remarriage do not exclude procreation, but they never facilitate transition to parenthood. Childlessness resulting from such "accidents de parcours" may be sociologically different from a manifest refusal to procreate, but the demographic outcome is identical. Simons is also right in pointing out that parenthood is still valued by a large majority of the EEC-population despite the shift towards tolerance of non-conformism. But there are clear signs that the anchorage of parenthood to either institutional or civil religion may not be as secure as he suggests.

A strong bond with institutional religion is currently of relevance only for some 20% of the EEC-citizens above age 18. Simons assumes that the other 80 per cent have a firm sense of civil responsibility. The main finding of the EVS, however, is that very large differences between the age groups can be found, and age was not a variable in Simons' analysis. The younger cohorts score considerably higher than their predecessors on post-materialism, leftism, dissatisfaction and much lower on nationalism and even overall morality (e.g. the Ten Commandments). This is compensated by more supranationalism and, above all, more tolerance towards minorities and persons with differing opinions in general. The implication of such a shift is that demographic renewal through reproduction is favoured less among the younger than the older generations, whereas renewal operating through immigration and integration may be favoured more among them. There is a shift in the content of civil religion which may be propitious for one form of demographic recruitment i.e. immigration, but not for the other, i.e. reproduction. Obviously, opinions are subject to short period fluctuations too, but the difference between the generations seems firm.

The key issue in interpreting the EVS concerns the meaning of the age-related effects in terms of life-cycle versus cohort effects. If the

results for the Inglehart-scale can be generalized, then shifts in its strongest correlates (leftism, supranationalism, tolerance etc.) probably contain a major cohort effect as well. Secularization too must be largely driven by cohort changes. Like the Merchant of Prato, one is likely to worry more about salvation and past sins as one ages, but an age effect cannot account for the almost uninterrupted trend toward more secularism during the last century.

Considering these age-related, and presumably mainly cohort-specific, effects found in the EVS together with the signs of the associations presented in table 3 and, especially, table 4, and considering that individuals value parenthood essentially for their own private satisfaction rather than as a fulfillment of a higher-order societal duty, the anchorage of parenthood to civil religion may become less secure as well (cf. the outcomes for the youngest cohorts in Denmark and the Netherlands). Western societies, with their strong commitment to individualism and pluralism are not well equipped to defend the aggregate interest in this respect. For instance, all western European societies have built their welfare states largely on the notion of intergenerational solidarity (e.g. pay as you go-pension systems, collective health and unemployment insurance) which assume demographic continuity. But none has penalties of any weight against "free riders" who do not contribute to that continuity. To summarize, we see no signs of a rise in commitment to those aspects of institutional or civil religion that foster higher fertility.

We consider the ideational developments, as illustrated here, as the powers that determine the baseline trend of fertility. Our explanation for the failure of the prediction of rising period fertility is the 1980's generated by Easterlin's hypothesis rests on the argument that his dynamics did not take this ideational baseline into account. The critique is of course not directed only at Easterlin's original work, but at the bulk of forecasts built on a strict micro-economic argumentation. There is, however, hope: recent economic essays incorporate a concept of "altruism", thereby implicitly or explicitly recognizing the existence of a moral dimension that can be transmitted through socialization and which can alter the demographic outcomes.

As stressed in the introduction, our analysis does not mean that responses

to changing material conditions and opportunity structures do not matter. We fully realize that growing opportunities for younger men have been historically associated with earlier union formation and faster transition to parenthood. The decline of the Malthusian late marriage pattern after 1870 in Europe is a clear example. Increasing non-domestic opportunities for women, judging from the postwar record, lead rather to a slower transition and possibly to stopping at a lower parity. Employment opportunities for men and women may have opposite effects, but together they produce nuptiality and fertility waves which are superimposed on the ideationally driven baseline trend. This amounts to saying that the medium-term swings, produced by shifting opportunity structures for males and females separately, add up to the period-effects on fertility, whereas the ideational baseline produces the long term cohort effects.

This decomposition is too simple to be true. It leaves out all the interactions between the economic and the ideational spheres. These may prove to be extremely difficult to forecast. For instance, we have argued along Easterlin's lines, that the spurt toward more post-materialism and its correlates is linked to the "Great Expectations" of the 1960's. But the generations socialized after the magic year 1968 have experienced very different economic conditions, and yet they have continued the secular trend towards more post-materialism. Hence, the ideational trend is carried by several forces (e.g. general distrust of institutions) which form a historical chain and which are not reducible to a simple economic mechanism. Conversely, neo-liberalism as an economic doctrine in the EEC has its roots in increased individualism and increased "post-materialist" frustration with the "greedy and clumsy state". If we are to believe its advocates, economic policies inspired by this doctrine would lead the EEC out of the tunnel of the economic slump, and into the creation of new opportunities. If that weren't so, "de effectionibus non est disputandum". The outcome is a complex dynamics of mutual interactions which are historically patterned, but which leave ample room for historical ideosyncracy as well. Maybe, that is why nations differ.

In the meantime, predictions need to be made. Ours is of continued below replacement fertility, for three reasons:

i) We do not see a basic change in the ideational components: tolerance

for non-conformism is likely to rise further in most EEC-countries and the shifts towards more post-materialism imply that other projects in life are likely to exert a great deal of attraction. Most of these compete with the transition to parenthood. The net result is a continued postponement of events that irrevokably pin individuals down to new and major responsabilities (cf. Goode, 1984). The problem for an increasing number of couples is "how long can we wait" (Menken, 1985).

ii) Any personal desire for parenthood can be satisfied with one or two children. The numbers of third-order children are likely to remain too small to fully compensate for the zero or one-child families. In some countries childlessness is likely to increase, not only as a result of more frequent partner changes, but possibly in response to a weakening of the meaning-giving supports of parenthood. Every percentage point rise in ultimate childlessness is of basic significance, not only for period or cohort-levels of aggregate fertility, but also for the survival of the principle of intergenerational solidarity.

iii) Male and female opportunities tend to fluctuate together in response to economic cycles. But, as the sex-specific changes in opportunity structures have opposite effects on the timing of union- and family formation, some dampening is to be expected in their joint impact.

We do not rule out small temporary rises in period fertility (the late starters of the 1970s and early 1980s may now try to make up for a portion of their reproductive postponement, and the economic future may be slightly less dim than the recent past for the younger generations), but we do not expect such rises to announce the coming of a new era. For that to occur, we need a fundamental drift toward a greater commitment to civil religion and a greater awareness of the "limits of self-fulfillment". The final question is what might produce such a shift.

FOOTNOTES

(1) Charles Tilly (1986) questions the proposition that votes for parties without a religious affiliation and often with explicit agnostic doctrines would constitute a valid proxy for region-by-region variation in secular attitudes. He offers no additional reasoning for his statement, other than that leftist voting also occurred among wage-earning agricultural labourers in areas with large-scale agricultural enterprises. Ironically, we had made this particular observation several years ago (Lesthaeghe, 1983), with the aim of showing that secular voting was far from being a perfect correlate of urbanization and industrialization, but an indicator of another dimension needing incorporation in the theory of fertility transition along with several existing and more "classic" explanations. Furthermore, Tilly seems to be ignorant about the continental form of ideological, political, religious and social cleavages commonly brought together under the heading of "pillarization" (Versäulung, verzuiling) that came into existence from the 1870s onward and lasted at least a full century. Demographers, starting with Julius Wolf in 1912, are obviously more familiar with the impact of such strong moral and social patronage of churches and affiliated parties (including Spanish and to a large extent also Italian fascism) and with the Catholic doctrine since Pius IX regarding the family, procreation and contraception, the position of women and economic corporatism. They are not likely to qualify the measurement of secularism through voting for leftist or liberal parties (obviously in juxtapposition to parties with religious affiliations and right-wing parties) as "slapdash measurement" or "whiping cloths pulled from a ragbag" (Tilly's sophisticated terminology). The fact that the UK and the US did not develop a patterning along the lines of pillarization (which is for instance still reflected into the development or maintenance of a two-party system) is not a reason for expecting the rest of the world to follow Tilly's model resting on a single feature: proletarization. Non-acceptance of the role of proletarization would constitute a dramatic omission, only rivaled by the failure to incorporate the patterning of ideological and social diversity of "Versäulung" into the demographic (or any other) history of much of continental Europe.

(2) John Simons' article (1980, p.143) shows, at least for Britain, that the baby boom of the 1950s and early 1960s, is perfectly matched by a rise in religious practice. In this instance, Easter duty fulfillment rose from 1947 to a postwar maximum in 1954-61 and fell steeply from 1963 onwards. In fact, Simons' indicator of "institutional religion" matches the British fertility history from the beginning of the century till the late 1970s, including all ups and downs. Such a set of matching time series provides no proof of causality, but at least, it rivals with a similar matching produced by Easterlin for the postwar period only. Moreover, Simons' parallel would still hold for the 1980s given the overall low levels of Easter duty fulfillment, whereas Easterlin's match between period fertility and relative cohort sizes has been disrupted. Simons' time series also indicates that Louis Roussel's objection to the secularization-hypothesis (1985), namely that it could not account for the baby boom, may not be substantiated and that it would be worthwhile to check the connection in countries other than the UK as well.

(3) The same questionnaire has also been used in samples in the US, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Japan, Korea, but these data were not available to us. A general description and first analysis of the EEC-data set can be found in Stoetzel (1983). R.A. de Moor (1983) presents a general factor analysis of EVS-items for the EEC-sample. For three key articles concerning value research and its measurement issues, see Kluckhohn e.a. (1959), Converse (1964), Inglehart (1985).

(4) Current work by D. Pauly, building the scales for each country separately, shows that the loss of information by omitting country specificity is negligible: Guttman-patterns emerge with little variation in coefficients of reproducibility and scalability, and factor loadings remain highly consistent with those produced for the entire sample.

(5) This is in agreement with H.Y.Lee's finding (1986) that women born after 1952 in Flanders married later but started a sexual union earlier

than the preceding cohorts, except for young women with regular church attendance who, irrespective of education, have an overall delay in union formation due to their reluctance to entering consensual unions.

Table A1 : Descriptive statistics by country and age for Guttman scale of familism, both sexes combined, EVS 1981

High score = high familism	Natl. $\bar{X}$	Natl. σ	$\bar{X}$(50+)	$\bar{X}$(LT30)	Shift $\bar{X}$(LT30)-$\bar{X}$(50+)	Shift expressed in overall σ
1 Ireland	3.45	.84	3.75	3.10	-.65	-.67
2 Ulster	3.16	.95	3.60	2.68	-.92	-.95
3 UK	2.95	.92	3.27	2.66	-.61	-.63
4 Spain	2.94	1.03	3.28	2.36	-.92	-.95
5 Italy	2.89	.98	3.23	2.56	-.67	-.69
6 Belgium	2.77	.92	3.02	2.46	-.56	-.58
7 Germany	2.75	.98	3.12	2.32	-.80	-.82
8 Netherlands	2.73	1.03	3.17	2.32	-.85	-.88
9 France	2.61	.93	2.90	2.28	-.62	-.64
10 Denmark	2.41	.85	2.65	2.06	-.59	-.61
All countries	2.82	.97	3.16	2.45	-.71	-.73

Note : percent missing 22.1

Table A2 : Descriptive statistics by country and age for principle component of non-conformism with respect to marriage and procreation, both sexes combined, EVS 1981

High score = high non-conformism	Natl. $\bar{X}$	Natl. σ	$\bar{X}$(50+)	$\bar{X}$(LT30)	shift $\bar{X}$(LT30)-$\bar{X}$(50+)	shift expressed in overall σ
1 France	2.81	1.02	2.54	3.06	+.52	+.56
2 Denmark	2.78	.82	2.62	3.04	+.42	+.45
3 Italy	2.38	1.03	2.05	2.73	+.68	+.73
4 Germany	2.35	.92	2.01	2.81	+.80	+.86
5 UK	2.33	.94	2.03	2.68	+.65	+.70
6 Spain	2.31	1.08	1.87	2.95	+1.08	+1.16
7 Belgium	2.31	.97	2.06	2.65	+.59	+.63
8 Netherlands	2.26	1.01	1.88	2.55	+.67	+.72
9 Ulster	1.94	1.02	1.50	2.40	+.90	+.97
10 Ireland	1.70	.93	1.28	2.09	+.81	+.87
All Countries	2.42	1.01	2.09	2.81	+.72	+.71

Note : percent missing = 21.5

Table A3 : Descriptive statistics by country and age for Guttman scale of acceptability of divorce, both sexes combined, EVS 1981

High score = most grounds acceptable	Natl. $\bar{X}$	Natl. σ	$\bar{X}$(50+)	$\bar{X}$(LT35)	Shift $\bar{X}$(LT35)-$\bar{X}$(50+)	Shift expressed in overall σ
1 France	2.86	.98	2.82	2.89	+.07	+.07
2 Denmark	2.62	1.01	2.58	2.71	+.13	+.12
3 Germany	2.51	.95	2.42	2.56	+.14	+.13
4 UK	2.46	.99	2.39	2.50	+.11	+.10
5 Italy	2.27	1.09	2.19	2.33	+.14	+.13
6 Netherlands	2.22	.97	2.20	2.29	+.09	+.09
7 Belgium	2.22	1.06	2.15	2.33	+.18	+.17
8 Spain	2.17	1.15	1.87	2.50	+.63	+.60
9 Ulster	2.05	.96	1.91	2.26	+.35	+.33
10 Ireland	1.88	.99	1.57	2.18	+.61	+.58
All Countries	2.44	1.05	2.35	2.53	+.18	+.17

Note : percent missing = 0.3 percent

Table A4 : Descriptive statistics by country and age for Guttman scale of acceptability of abortion, both sexes combined, EVS 1981

High score = most grounds acceptable	Natl. $\bar{X}$	Natl. σ	$\bar{X}$(50+)	$\bar{X}$(LT30)	Shift $\bar{X}$(LT30)-$\bar{X}$(50+)	Shift expressed in overall σ
1 Denmark	3.32	.93	3.21	3.52	+.31	+.30
2 France	2.74	1.02	2.60	2.79	+.19	+.18
3 UK	2.50	1.01	2.44	2.50	+.06	+.06
4 Germany	2.45	.97	2.29	2.63	+.34	+.32
5 Italy	2.40	1.01	2.22	2.59	+.37	+.35
6 Netherlands	2.24	1.01	1.99	2.31	+.32	+.30
7 Belgium	2.24	.94	2.15	2.33	+.18	+.17
8 Ulster	1.88	.90	1.66	2.09	+.43	+.41
9 Spain	1.84	.98	1.54	2.29	+.75	+.72
10 Ireland	1.33	.68	1.17	1.46	+.29	+.28
All countries	2.41	1.04	2.25	2.56	+.31	+.30

Note : percent missing = 10.3

Table A5 : Descriptive statistics by country and age for the Guttman-scale of the meaning of parenthood and concern with the context of socialization, both sexes combined, EVS 1981

High score = high concern and strong attachment to parenthood	Natl.$\bar{X}$	Natl.σ	$\bar{X}$(50+)	$\bar{X}$(LT30)	shift $\bar{X}$(LT30)-$\bar{X}$(50+)	shift expressed in overall σ
1 France	3.32	.85	3.44	3.07	-.37	-.40
2 Spain	3.11	.84	3.23	2.90	-.33	-.35
3 Italy	3.04	.89	3.17	2.91	-.26	-.28
4 Belgium	2.92	.86	3.05	2.76	-.29	-.31
5 Ulster	2.86	.95	3.15	2.57	-.58	-.62
6 West-Germany	2.80	.90	3.06	2.51	-.55	-.59
7 Denmark	2.77	.99	3.09	2.28	-.81	-.87
8 Ireland	2.59	.91	2.74	2.40	-.31	-.37
9 UK	2.52	.93	2.77	2.27	-.50	-.54
10 Netherlands	2.44	.86	2.87	2.12	-.75	-.81
All Countries	2.91	.93	3.10	2.69	-.41	-.44

Note : per cent missing = 14.9

Table A6: Descriptive statistics by Age and Country for Selected Independent Variables; both sexes, EVS 1981

Guttman scale Religiosity	Natl. $\bar{X}$	Natl. σ	$\bar{X}$(50+)	$\bar{X}$(LT30)	Shift in abs. value $\bar{X}$(LT30)-$\bar{X}$(50+)	Shift, in overall σ
1 Ireland	3.42	.94	3.69	3.11	-.58	-.48
2 Ulster	3.17	1.11	3.71	2.47	-1.24	-1.02
3 Italy	2.90	1.09	3.20	2.48	-.72	-.60
4 Belgium	2.83	1.12	3.10	2.44	-.66	-.55
5 Spain	2.82	1.23	3.20	2.20	-1.00	-.83
6 Netherlands	2.66	1.28	3.06	2.25	-.81	-.67
7 F.R. Germany	2.54	1.22	3.02	1.83	-1.19	-.98
8 UK	2.33	1.20	2.77	1.79	-.98	-.81
9 France	2.06	1.12	2.46	1.66	-.80	-.66
10 Denmark	2.06	.97	2.46	1.50	-.96	-.76
Overall comparison	2.54	1.21	2.93	2.02	-.91	-.75

Note : percent missing = 15.3

Guttman scale 10 Commandments						
1 Ireland	3.18	.97	3.47	2.86	-.61	-.55
2 Ulster	3.09	1.08	3.61	2.61	-1.00	-.91
3 Italy	2.87	1.09	3.23	2.39	-.84	-.76
4 Belgium	2.58	1.14	2.96	2.14	-.82	-.75
5 F.R. Germany	2.58	1.10	2.99	2.02	-.97	-.88
6 UK	2.51	.98	2.90	2.01	-.89	-.81
7 Spain	2.44	1.18	2.90	1.82	-1.08	-.98
8 Denmark	2.39	.87	2.74	1.84	-.87	-.79
9 Netherlands	2.32	1.07	2.86	1.83	-1.03	-.94
10 France	2.06	1.03	2.50	1.61	-.89	-.81
Overall comparison	2.52	1.10	2.93	2.00	-.93	-.85

Note : percent missing = 14.2

Inglehart scale materialism						
1 Ulster	1.42	.57	1.51*	1.34	-.17	-.26
2 Spain	1.41	.65	1.62	1.14	-.48	-.73
3 Italy	1.39	.64	1.56	1.15	-.41	-.62
4 Ireland	1.32	.63	1.45	1.14	-.31	-.47
5 Belgium	1.19	.66	1.28	1.07	-.21	-.32
6 France	1.15	.70	1.32	1.01	-.31	-.47
7 UK	1.12	.60	1.20*	1.04	-.16	-.34
8 F.R. Germany	1.09	.65	1.30	.83	-.47	-.71
9 Netherlands	1.05	.67	1.19	.92	-.27	-.41
10 Denmark	.88	.63	.95	.76	-.19	-.29
Overall comparison	1.21	.66	1.36	1.02	-.34	-.52

Note : * Maximum for 40-49 instead of 50+; percent missing = 5.7

Table A6 : continued

Principle Component Scale Nationalism	Natl. $\bar{X}$	Natl. σ	$\bar{X}$(50+)	$\bar{X}$(LT30)	Shift in abs. value $\bar{X}$(LT30)-$\bar{X}$(50+)	Shift, in overall σ
1 Ireland	3.09	.96	3.18*	3.04	-.14	-.14
2 Spain	2.92	.99	3.04	2.65	-.39	-.38
3 UK	2.87	1.00	3.07	2.68	-.39	-.38
4 Denmark	2.79	.94	2.92	2.62	-.30	-.29
5 Italy	2.74	1.01	2.88	2.58	-.30	-.29
6 France	2.67	1.01	3.00	2.23	-.77	-.75
7 Netherlands	2.66	1.28	3.06	2.25	-.81	-.79
8 Belgium	2.60	.96	2.69	2.45	-.24	-.24
9 Ulster	2.43	.91	2.67*	2.39	-.28	-.27
10 F.R. Germany	2.34	.99	2.44	2.10	-.34	-.33
Overall comparison	2.68	1.02	2.85	2.46	-.39	-.38

Note : *Maximum for 30-39 instead of 50+; percent missing = 13.3

Principle Component Scale Leftism						
1 Spain	2.90	.91	2.67	3.13	+.46	+.49
2 France	2.85	.85	2.65	3.07	+.42	+.45
3 Italy	2.68	.85	2.54	2.85	+.31	+.33
4 Netherlands	2.45	.93	2.27	2.62	+.35	+.38
5 Belgium	2.27	.85	2.11	2.50	+.39	+.42
6 Denmark	2.26	.93	1.95	2.69	+.74	+.80
7 UK	2.26	.87	2.05	2.49	+.44	+.47
8 Ireland	2.19	.87	1.88	2.41	+.53	+.57
9 F.R. Germany	2.17	.92	1.92	2.51	+.59	+.63
10 Ulster	2.07	.89	1.92	2.19	+.27	+.29
Overall comparison	2.49	.93	2.27	2.75	+.48	+.52

Note : percent missing = 25.8

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